Philosophical Topics 32 (1&2):111-129 (2006)
|Abstract||This essay begins with a consideration of one way in which animals and persons may be valued as “irreplaceable.” Drawing on both Plato and Pascal, I consider reasons for skepticism regarding the legitimacy of this sort of attachment. While I do not offer a complete defense against such skepticism, I do show that worries here may be overblown due to the conflation of distinct metaphysical and normative concerns. I then go on to clarify what sort of value is at issue in cases of irreplaceable attachment. I characterize “unique value” as the kind of value attributed to a thing when we take that thing to be (theoretically, not just practically) irreplaceable. I then consider the relationship between this sort of value and intrinsic value. After considering the positions of Gowans, Moore, Korsgaard, Frankfurt, and others, I conclude that unique value is best understood not as a variety of intrinsic value but rather as one kind of final value that is grounded in the extrinsic properties of the object.|
|Keywords||irreplaceability, intrinsic value, final value, unique value, love|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael J. Zimmerman, Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Christopher Grau (2010). Love and History. Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (3):246-271.
Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000). A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for its Own Sake. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1):33–51.
John N. Martin (1979). The Concept of the Irreplaceable. Environmental Ethics 1 (1):31-48.
Cian Dorr (2012). De Re A Priori Knowledge. Mind 120 (480):939-991.
Christopher W. Gowans (1996). Intimacy, Freedom, and Unique Value: A "Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of Persons. American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1):75 - 89.
Fred Feldman (1998). Hyperventilating About Intrinsic Value. Journal of Ethics 2 (4):339-354.
Christopher Grau (2014). Love, Loss, and Identity in Solaris. In Susan Wolf & Christopher Grau (eds.), Understanding Love: Philosophy, Film, and Fiction. Oxford University Press.
Peter Vallentyne (1997). Intrinsic Properties Defined. Philosophical Studies 88 (2): 209-219.
Added to index2009-01-29
Total downloads102 ( #7,518 of 722,745 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #17,033 of 722,745 )
How can I increase my downloads?