In defense of objectivism about moral obligation

Ethics 121 (1):88-115 (2010)
Abstract
There is a debate in normative ethics about whether or not our moral obligations depend solely on either our evidence concerning, or our beliefs about, the world. Subjectivists maintain that they do and objectivists maintain that they do not. I shall offer some arguments in support of objectivism and respond to the strongest argument for subjectivism. I shall also briefly consider the significance of my discussion to the debate over whether one’s future voluntary actions are relevant to one’s current moral obligations
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Citations of this work BETA
Benj Hellie (2011). There It Is. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):110-164.
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