Kant's Concept of the Thing in Itself: An Interpretation

Review of Metaphysics 16 (4):770 - 779 (1963)
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Abstract

I shall develop the suggestion that the thing in itself is not in any sense a thing. Nor is it a term which refers to a reality in opposition to which objects of experience are unfavorably compared. Yet Kant uses language which sometimes suggests both, providing ground for Schrader's observation about both the obscurity and the perversity of the doctrine.

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