Liberal fundamentalism and its rivals

In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford. 93--115 (2006)
Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1..
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    Elizabeth Fricker (2012). Stating and Insinuating. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):61-94.
    Igor Douven & Stefaan E. Cuypers (2009). Fricker on Testimonial Justification. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):36-44.
    Philip J. Nickel (2012). Trust and Testimony. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (3):301-316.
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