Liberal fundamentalism and its rivals
In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford (2006)
| Abstract | Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1.. | |||||||||
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