Levels of criticism: Handling Popperian problems in a Popperian way [Book Review]

Axiomathes 18 (1):37-48 (2008)
Popper emphasised both the problem-solving nature of human knowledge, and the need to criticise a scientific theory as strongly as possible. These aims seem to contradict each other, in that the former stresses the problems that motivate scientific theories while the one ignores the character of the problems that led to the formation of the theories against which the criticism is directed. A resolution is proposed in which problems as such are taken as prime in the search for knowledge, and subject to discussion. This approach is then applied to the problem of induction. Popper set great stake to his solution of it, but others doubted its legitimacy, in ways that are clarified by changing the form of the induction problem itself. That change draws upon logic, which is the subject of another application: namely, in contrast to Popper’s adhesion to classical logic as the only welcome form (because of the maximal strength of criticism that it dispenses), can other logics be used without abandoning his philosophy of criticism?
Keywords Testing theories  Induction  Popper  Logics in science
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-007-9017-9
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References found in this work BETA
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.

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