Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 147 (3):461-475 (2005)
|Abstract||Keeley has recently argued that the philosophical issue of how to analyse the concept of a sense can usefully be addressed by considering how scientists, and more specifically neuroethologists, classify the senses. After briefly outlining his proposal, which is based on the application of an ordered set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for modality differentiation, I argue, by way of two complementary counterexamples, that it fails to account fully for the way the senses are in fact individuated in neuroethology and other relevant sciences. I suggest substantial modifications to Keeley|
|Keywords||Differentiation Individuation Modality Neuroscience Science Sense Keeley, Brian|
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