Probing for relevance: What metacognition tells us about the power of consciousness

Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):172-177 (2000)
Metacognitive attitudes can affect behavior but do they do so, as Koriat claims, because they enhance voluntary control? This Commentary makes a case for saying that metacognitive consciousness may enhance not control but subjective predictability and may be best studied by examining not just healthy, well-integrated cognizers, but victims of multilevel mental disorders
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DOI 10.1006/ccog.2000.0434
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
David M. Rosenthal (1986). Two Concepts of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 49 (May):329-59.
Kathleen V. Wilkes (1984). Is Consciousness Important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.

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Asher Koriat (2007). Metacognition and Consciousness. In P D Zelazo, M Moscovitch & E Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press

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