Synaesthesia and misrepresentation: A reply to Wager

Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):339-46 (2001)
Abstract
Wager has argued that synaesthesia provides material for a counterexample to representational theories of the phenomenal character of experience. He gives a series of three cases based on synaesthesia; he requires the second and third cases to bolster the doubtfulness of the first. Here I further endorse the problematic nature of the first case and then show why the other two cases do not save his argument. I claim that whenever synaesthesia is a credible possibility its phenomenal character can be understood in terms of misrepresentation
Keywords Mind  Psychology  Science  Synaesthesia  Wager, A
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