The dispensability of metaphor
British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (3):255-272 (2010)
| Abstract | Many philosophers claim that metaphor is indispensable for various purposes. What I shall call the ‘Indispensability Thesis’ is the view that we use at least some metaphors to think, to express, to communicate, or to discover what cannot be thought, expressed, communicated, or discovered without metaphor. I argue in this paper that support for the Indispensability Thesis is based on several confusions. I criticize arguments presented by Stephen Yablo, Berys Gaut, Richard Boyd, and Elisabeth Camp for the Indispensability Thesis, and distinguish it from several plausible claims with which it is easily confused. Although I do not show that the thesis is false, I provide seven grounds for suspicion of our sense (if we have it) that some metaphors are indispensable for the purposes claimed by advocates of the Indispensability Thesis. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Robert C. Robinson (2011). Causation as Metaphor. Rupkatha Journal On Interdisciplinary Studies in Humanities 3 (1):181—190.
Elisabeth Camp (2006). Metaphor in the Mind: The Cognition of Metaphor. Philosophy Compass 1 (2):154-170.
David Enoch (2003). An Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism. Dissertation, New York University
Elisabeth Camp (2006). Metaphor and That Certain 'Je Ne Sais Quoi'. Philosophical Studies 129 (1):1 - 25.
Thomas Frentz (2011). Creative Metaphors, Synchronicity, and Quantum Physics. Philosophy and Rhetoric 44 (2):101-128.
James Grant (2011). Metaphor and Criticism BSA Prize Essay, 2010. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):237-257.
Patrick S. Dieveney (2007). Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument. Synthese 157 (1):105 - 128.
Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):231-250.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-07-10Total downloads110 ( #5,007 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,320 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |

