Graduate studies at Western
Faith and Philosophy 25 (1):75-78 (2008)
|Abstract||Warfield (1997, 2000) argues that divine foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible. He assumes for conditional proof that there is a necessarilyexistent omniscient being. He also assumes that it is possible for there to be a person who both does something and could have avoided doing it. As supportfor this latter premise he points to the fact that nearly every participant to the debate accepts the falsity of logical fatalism. Appealing to this consensus, however, renders the argument question-begging, for that consensus has emerged only against the backdrop of an assumption that there is no necessarily existent omniscient being|
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