Theory change as dimensional change: conceptual spaces applied to the dynamics of empirical theories
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 190 (6):1039-1058 (2013)
This paper offers a novel way of reconstructing conceptual change in empirical theories. Changes occur in terms of the structure of the dimensions—that is to say, the conceptual spaces—underlying the conceptual framework within which a given theory is formulated. Five types of changes are identified: (1) addition or deletion of special laws, (2) change in scale or metric, (3) change in the importance of dimensions, (4) change in the separability of dimensions, and (5) addition or deletion of dimensions. Given this classification, the conceptual development of empirical theories becomes more gradual and rationalizable. Only the most extreme type—replacement of dimensions—comes close to a revolution. The five types are exemplified and applied in a case study on the development within physics from the original Newtonian mechanics to special relativity theory
|Keywords||Conceptual spaces Dimensional analysis Incommensurability Newtonian mechanics Scientific revolution Special relativity theory Theory change|
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References found in this work BETA
Hanne Andersen (2006). The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Cambridge University Press.
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Philip Chandler (1975). Clairaut's Critique of Newtonian Attraction: Some Insights Into His Philosophy of Science. Annals of Science 32 (4):369-378.
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Citations of this work BETA
Frank Zenker & Peter Gärdenfors (2013). Modeling Diachronic Changes in Structuralism and in Conceptual Spaces. Erkenntnis:1-15.
Lieven Decock, Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp & Sylvia Wenmackers (2014). Knowledge and Approximate Knowledge. Erkenntnis 79:1129-1150.
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