David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):24-25 (1997)
Corresponding to Glenberg's distinction between the automatic and effortful modes of memory, I propose a distinction between cued and detached mental representations. A cued representation stands for something that is present in the external situation of the representing organism, while a detached representation stands for objects or events that are not present in the current situation. This distinction is important for understanding the role of memory in different cognitive functions like planning and pretense.
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