Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):383 - 400 (2004)
|Abstract||A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where Ss true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form X occurred because Y occurred require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more familiar versions. It is argued that the position: (a) yields a better solution to the lottery problem, and (b) may be grounded in a more general theory of virtue and credit.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robin McKenna (2011). Interests Contextualism. Philosophia 39 (4):741-750.
Dirk Koppelberg (2004). On the Prospects for Virtue Contextualism: Comments on Greco. Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):401--413.
Elke Brendel (2005). Why Contextualists Cannot Know They Are Right: Self-Refuting Implications of Contextualism. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (2):38-55.
Sarah Wright (2010). Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism. Metaphilosophy 41 (1):95-114.
Elke Brendel & Christoph Jäger (2004). Contextualist Approaches to Epistemology: Problems and Prospects. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):143 - 172.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):437–447.
Finn Spicer (2006). Epistemic Intuitions and Epistemic Contextualism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):366 - 385.
John Greco (2008). What's Wrong with Contextualism? Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416 - 436.
Martin Montminy (2007). Epistemic Contextualism and the Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction. Synthese 155 (1):99 - 125.
B. Brogaard (2004). Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem. Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #46,375 of 722,871 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,871 )
How can I increase my downloads?