David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68 (1992)
In this paper it is argued that we would not be logically obliged or rationally inclined to reject the ontology of contentful psychological states postulated by folk psychology even if the explanations advanced by folk psychology turned out to be generally inaccurate or inadequate. Moreover, it is argued that eliminativists such as Paul Churchland do not establish that folk psychological explanations are, or are likely to prove, generally inaccurate or inadequate. Most of Churchland's arguments—based upon developments within connectionist neuroscience—only cast doubt upon the adequacy of 'sentential' theories of cognitive processing, not upon scientifically developed forms of folk psychological explanation of behavior, such as those offered by contemporary social psychology. Finally, it is noted that Churchland's brand of eliminativism rests upon a crude reductive criterion of theoretical adequacy that has little to recommend it, and suggested that the recognized theoretical limitations of contemporary social psychology may be precisely due to its historical commitment to this reductive criterion
|Keywords||Eliminativism Folk Psychology Materialism Science|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
John D. Greenwood (1993). Split Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
John D. Greenwood (1993). Split-Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
Similar books and articles
Teed Rockwell, Beyond Eliminative Materialism: Some Unnoticed Implications of Paul Churchland's Pragmatic Pluralism.
Peter Godfrey-Smith (2005). Folk Psychology as a Model. Philosophers' Imprint 5 (6):1-16.
Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Terence E. Horgan & David K. Henderson (2005). What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism. In Mind as a Scientific Object. Oxford University Press.
Barbara Hannan (1993). Don't Stop Believing: The Case Against Eliminative Materialism. Mind and Language 8 (2):165-179.
Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. 191--209.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Kenneth A. Taylor (1994). How Not to Refute Eliminative Materialism. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):101-125.
John M. Preston (1989). Folk Psychology as Theory or Practice? The Case for Eliminative Materialism. Inquiry 32 (September):277-303.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads46 ( #35,249 of 1,098,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #33,712 of 1,098,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?