Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):41 - 49 (1990)
|Abstract||In "The Domino Theory" Professor Katz's general thesis is that the arguments against intensionalism advanced in the last four decades are arranged like so many dominos, since they all rest upon Quine's arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism". If this is the case, then they are all vitiated if Quine's original arguments are unsatisfactory, and fall like so many dominos. I propose to accept, if only for the sake of argument, that all the other critiques of intensionalism which Katz mentions do ultimately depend upon the acceptance of Quine's original strictures, although I will express some doubt about this in the case of the indeterminacy of translation thesis. In this paper I will concentrate on Katz's argument against the first Quinian domino.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Donald Hockney (1975). The Bifurcation of Scientific Theories and Indeterminacy of Translation. Philosophy of Science 42 (4):411-427.
Philip L. Peterson (1984). Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Underdetermination. Philosophy of Science 51 (3):464-487.
Paul Artin Boghossian (1996). Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30 (3):360-391.
Peter Pagin (2008). Indeterminacy and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinctions: A Survey. Synthese 164 (1):1 - 18.
Marian David (1996). Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. Philosophical Perspectives 10:281 - 296.
Eric Loomis & Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
Cory Juhl (2009). Analyticity. Routledge.
J. M. Katz (1990). The Domino Theory. Philosophical Studies 58 (1-2):3-39.
Matti Eklund (2007). The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #67,474 of 548,984 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )
How can I increase my downloads?