Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity

Cambridge University Press (2010)
When we affirm that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us.
Keywords Knowledge, Theory of  Normativity (Ethics
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Call number BD161.G725 2010
ISBN(s) 0521193915   9780521193917   9780511844645
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