David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (2010)
When we affirm that someone knows something, we are making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is something superior about that person's opinion, or their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue. This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of value it has for us.
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Normativity (Ethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$17.00 new (86% off) $23.89 used (80% off) $115.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BD161.G725 2010|
|ISBN(s)||0521193915 9780521193917 9780511844645|
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Citations of this work BETA
Susanna Schellenberg (2016). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence. Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.
Allan Hazlett (2012). Factive Presupposition and the Truth Condition on Knowledge. Acta Analytica 27 (4):461-478.
J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):63-109.
Christoph Kelp (2013). Extended Cognition and Robust Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):245-252.
Will Fleisher (forthcoming). Virtuous Distinctions. Synthese:1-31.
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