David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614 (2012)
In this paper, I show that we should understand the direction of fit of beliefs and desires in normative terms. After rehearsing a standard objection to Michael Smith’s analysis of direction of fit, I raise a similar problem for Lloyd Humberstone’s analysis. I go on to offer my own account, according to which the difference between beliefs and desires is determined by the normative relations such states stand in. I argue that beliefs are states which we have reason to change in light of the world, whereas desires are states that give us reason to change the world. After doing this, I show how the view avoids various objections, including two from David Sobel and David Copp. The paper ends by briefly discussing the relevance of the view to the Humean theory of motivation.
|Keywords||Direction of fit Belief Desire Humean theory of motivation Reasons Normativity of mind|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Robert Brandom (2000). Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Harvard University Press.
Niko Kolodny (2005). Why Be Rational? Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Ralph Wedgwood (2002). The Aim of Belief. Philosophical Perspectives 36 (s16):267-97.
Citations of this work BETA
Avery Archer (2015). Reconceiving Direction of Fit. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):171-180.
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