Decomposition and analysis in frege'sgrundgesetze

History and Philosophy of Logic 17 (1-2):121-139 (1996)
Abstract
Frege seems to hold two incompatible theses:(i) that sentences differing in structure can yet express the same sense; and (ii) that the senses of the meaningful parts of a complex term are determinate parts of the sense of the term. Dummett offered a solution, distinguishing analysis from decomposition. The present paper offers an embellishment of Dummett?s distinction by providing a way of depicting the internal structures of complex senses?determinate structures that yield distinct decompositions. Decomposition is then shown to be adequate as a foundation for the informativity and analyticity of logic
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References found in this work BETA
Gregory Currie (1985). The Analysis of Thoughts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (3):283 – 298.
Pieranna Garavaso (1991). Frege and the Analysis of Thoughts. History and Philosophy of Logic 12 (2):195-210.

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