David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):121 - 132 (2012)
In a recent monograph, Sandy Goldberg argues that epistemology should be renovated so as to accommodate the way in which human beings are dependent on others for what they know. He argues that the way to accomplish this is to consider the cognition of others to be part of the belief-forming process for the purposes of epistemic assessment when radical dependence on others is in evidence. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to what one may expect, a credit theory of knowledge is well positioned to make the sort of anti-individualistic move that Goldberg advocates. Furthermore, unlike Goldberg's extended process reliabilism, an extended credit theory has a theoretically motivated way of restricting the domain of epistemic evaluation to the cognitive. Finally, I argue that, although adopting the extended cognition hypothesis would help Goldberg's position, an extended credit theory would still have the advantage
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References found in this work BETA
S. Goldberg (2009). The Social Virtues: Two Accounts. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 24 (4):237-248.
Sanford Goldberg (2010). Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
John Greco (2010). Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief&Quot;. In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 111-134.
John Greco (2007). The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.
Citations of this work BETA
Adam Green (2014). Evaluating Distributed Cognition. Synthese 191 (1):79-95.
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