Frege's puzzle about the cognitive function of truth

Inquiry 47 (5):425 – 442 (2004)
Abstract The aim of this paper is to give a detailed reconstruction of Frege's solution to his puzzle about the cognitive function of truth, which is this: On the one hand, the concept of truth seems to play an essential role in acquiring knowledge because the transition from the mere hypothetical assumption that p to the acknowledgement of its truth is a crucial step in acquiring the knowledge that p, while, on the other hand, this concept seems to be completely redundant because the sense of the word 'true' does not make any essential contribution to the senses of the sentences in which it occurs.
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