Having know-how: Intellect, action, and recent work on Ryle's distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530 (2010)
Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing-how/knowing-that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge-how is non-propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Colin Allen & Marc Bekoff (1997). Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology. MIT Press.
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Lewis Carroll (1895). What the Tortoise Said to Achilles. Mind 4 (14):278-280.
Dorothy L. Cheney & Robert M. Seyfarth (1990). How Monkeys See the World: Inside the Mind of Another Species. University of Chicago Press.
Fred Dretske (1986). Misrepresentation. In R. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. Oxford University Press 17--36.
Citations of this work BETA
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2014). The Structure of Practical Expertise. Philosophia 42 (2):539-554.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Winch (2009). Ryle on Knowing How and the Possibility of Vocational Education. Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):88-101.
Huiming Ren (2012). The Distinction Between Knowledge-That and Knowledge-How. Philosophia 40 (4):857-875.
Marcus P. Adams (2009). Empirical Evidence and the Knowledge-That/Knowledge-How Distinction. Synthese 170 (1):97 - 114.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Tobias Rosefeldt (2004). Is Knowing-How Simply a Case of Knowing-That? Philosophical Investigations 27 (4):370–379.
Garry Young (2009). Case Study Evidence for an Irreducible Form of Knowing How To: An Argument Against a Reductive Epistemology. Philosophia 37 (2):341-360.
Paul Snowdon (2003). Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1–29.
Leslie Marsh (2010). Ryle and Oakeshott on the “Knowing-How/Knowing-That” Distinction. In Corey Abel (ed.), The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott's Conservatism.
Christos Douskos (2013). The Linguistic Argument for Intellectualism. Synthese 190 (12):2325-2340.
Ellen Fridland (2013). Problems with Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):879-891.
Ron Sun & Xi Zhang, Accessibility Versus Action-Centeredness in the Representation of Cognitive Skills.
Ellen Fridland (2012). Knowing‐How: Problems and Considerations. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2).
Added to index2010-12-02
Total downloads121 ( #13,285 of 1,700,337 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #105,649 of 1,700,337 )
How can I increase my downloads?