David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42 (1):24-31 (2006)
Murray G. Murphey’s masterful treatment of C. I. Lewis’s philosophy leaves two things amply clear: first, that Lewis struggled with skeptical arguments from Hume throughout his career; and second, that Lewis never adequately resolved the problems raised by those arguments. In this paper I will consider Lewis’s approach to Hume’s skepticism in Mind and the World Order (MWO) and in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV), and I will argue that Lewis’s reply to Hume in these works did not change as dramatically as Murphey claims. Nevertheless, I agree with Murphey that there are two quite different lines of reply discernable in Lewis, and that neither adequately answers Hume. In the final part of the paper I argue that Lewis’s pragmatism gives us resources for an adequate reply to Hume’s skeptical arguments, although it is not the reply that Lewis himself gives.
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References found in this work BETA
James van Cleve (1984). Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):555--67.
James Van Cleve (1984). Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):555-567.
Citations of this work BETA
Scott Aikin (2009). Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given. Human Affairs 19 (1).
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