David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563 (2002)
Moore's 'Proof of an External World' has evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, including bafflement, indignation and sympathetic reconstruction. I argue that Moore should be understood as following Thomas Reid on a variety of points, both epistemological and methodological. Moreover, Moore and Reid are exactly right on all of these points. Hence what I present is a defence of Moore's 'Proof', as well as an interpretation. Finally, I argue that the Reid-Moore position is useful for resolving an issue that has recently received attention in epistemology, namely, how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat?
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Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
G. C. Stine (1976). Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure. Philosophical Studies 29 (4):249--261.
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George Edward Moore (1939). Proof of an External World. Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We 'Re Not Brains in Vats?'. Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
Citations of this work BETA
Boaz Miller (2016). What is Hacking’s Argument for Entity Realism? Synthese 193 (3):991-1006.
Patrick Rysiew (2005). Reidian Evidence. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 3 (2):107-121.
John Greco (2007). External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass 2 (4):625–649.
James Owen Weatherall (2015). On G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2).
Peter Baumann (2009). Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.
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