How to Reid Moore

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563 (2002)
Abstract
Moore's 'Proof of an External World' has evoked a variety of responses from philosophers, including bafflement, indignation and sympathetic reconstruction. I argue that Moore should be understood as following Thomas Reid on a variety of points, both epistemological and methodological. Moreover, Moore and Reid are exactly right on all of these points. Hence what I present is a defence of Moore's 'Proof', as well as an interpretation. Finally, I argue that the Reid-Moore position is useful for resolving an issue that has recently received attention in epistemology, namely, how is it that one knows that one is not a brain in a vat?
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References found in this work BETA
Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
Keith DeRose (2000). How Can We Know That We're Not Brains in Vats? Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):121-148.
John Greco (1995). Reid's Critique of Berkeley and Hume: What's the Big Idea? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):279-296.
John Haldane (2000). Thomas Reid. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):317-344.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Baumann (2009). Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.
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