David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Economics and Philosophy 7 (02):143- (1991)
It is commonplace to suppose that the theory of individual rational choice is considerably less problematic than the theory of collective rational choice. In particular, it is often assumed by philosophers, economists, and other social scientists that an individual's choices among outcomes (or lotteries yielding specified probabilities of outcomes) accurately reflect that individual's underlying preferences or values. Further, it is now well known that if an individual's choices among outcomes (or lotteries thereof) satisfy certain plausible axioms of rationality or consistency, that individual's choice-behavior can be interpreted as maximizing expected utility on a utility scale that is unique up to a linear transformation (Ramsey, 1931; Savage, 1954; Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944). Hence, there is, in principle, an empirically respectable method of measuring individuals' values and a single unified schema for explaining their actions as value maximizing (insofar as they act rationally).
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References found in this work BETA
John Rawls (1971/2005). A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press.
Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Hobbes (2012/2006). Leviathan. Clarendon Press.
Richard B. Brandt (1998). A Theory of the Good and the Right. Prometheus Books.
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Citations of this work BETA
Stephen Ellis (2006). Multiple Objectives: A Neglected Problem in the Theory of Human Action. Synthese 153 (2):313 - 338.
Stephen Ellis (2008). The Main Argument for Value Incommensurability (and Why It Fails). Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):27-43.
Tyler Cowen (1993). The Scope and Limits of Preference Sovereignty. Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):253-.
Gregory S. Kavka (1993). Internal Prisoner's Dilemma Vindicated. Economics and Philosophy 9 (01):171-.
J. Moreh (1993). Are There Internal Prisoner's Dilemmas?: A Comment on Kavka's Article. Economics and Philosophy 9 (01):165-.
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