Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):327–348 (2004)
|Abstract||Kripkean examples of necessary a posteriori truths clearly provide a challenge to attempts to connect facts about possibility to facts about what people can conceive. The paper argues for a general principle connecting imaginability under certain special circumstances to possibility; it also discusses some of the issues raised by the resulting position.|
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