``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief"

In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 111-134 (2003)
Abstract
The paper begins by reviewing two problems for fallibilism: the lottery problem, or the problem of explaining why fallible evidence, though otherwise excellent, is not enough to know that one will lose the lottery, and Gettier problems. It is then argued that both problems can be resolved if we note an important illocutionary force of knowledge attributions: namely, that when we attribute knowledge to someone we mean to give the person credit for getting things right. Alternatively, to say that a person knows is to say that she got things right due to her own abilities, efforts and actions, rather than due to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else
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John Greco (2009). Knowledge and Success From Ability. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.

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