Knowledge and success from ability

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):17 - 26 (2009)
This paper argues that knowledge is an instance of a more general and familiar normative kind—that of success through ability (or success through excellence, or success through virtue). This thesis is developed in the context of three themes prominent in the recent literature: that knowledge attributions are somehow context sensitive; that knowledge is intimately related to practical reasoning; and that one purpose of the concept of knowledge is to flag good sources of information. Wedding these themes to the proposed account helps to explain a wide range of standard Gettier problems. It also helps to explain barn façade cases, which require a different kind of treatment.
Keywords Knowledge  Intellectual virtue  Gettier cases  Barn façade cases
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    References found in this work BETA
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
    Stewart Cohen (1988). How to Be a Fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2:91-123.
    Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
    Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2010). Unreasonable Knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.

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