Logic in Russell's Principles of Mathematics

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 37 (4):554-584 (1996)
Unaware of Frege's 1879 Begriffsschrift, Russell's 1903 The Principles of Mathematics set out a calculus for logic whose foundation was the doctrine that any such calculus must adopt only one style of variables–entity (individual) variables. The idea was that logic is a universal and all-encompassing science, applying alike to whatever there is–propositions, universals, classes, concrete particulars. Unfortunately, Russell's early calculus has appeared archaic if not completely obscure. This paper is an attempt to recover the formal system, showing its philosophical background and its semantic completeness with respect to the tautologies of a modern sentential calculus
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DOI 10.1305/ndjfl/1040046142
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David Bostock (2009). Russell's Early Theory of Denoting. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):49-67.

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David Bostock (2009). Russell's Early Theory of Denoting. History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (1):49-67.

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