Emergent Australasian Philosophers 4 (1) (2011)
|Abstract||Moral nihilism (the denial of the existence of objective moral values) has been argued for for thousands of years. Despite such arguments this view is by no means the majority view. One of the most influential moral nihilists of the 20th Century was John Leslie Mackie, who gave arguments for this position. These arguments, despite many objections, have not been convincingly or decisively overcome. If the arguments are still good, why is moral nihilism such an uncommon view? One possible reason that this view is not more popular among moral philosophers is because it seems to lead to unacceptable consequences: moral fictionalism or abolitionism. I will argue that such philosophers are correct in rejecting moral fictionalism as unacceptable; but that abolitionism is actually a rational, reasonable position that should not cast doubt upon our morally nihilistic beliefs.|
|Keywords||Moral Nihilism Eliminativism Fictionalism|
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