Moore's Paradox, Truth and Accuracy

Acta Analytica 26 (3):243-255 (2011)
Abstract
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections
Keywords Moore  Paradox  Assertion  Belief  Pragmatic  Semantic
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References found in this work BETA
Claudio de Almeida (2001). What Moore's Paradox is About. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):33-58.
Richard Foley (1979). Justified Inconsistent Beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247 - 257.
Mitchell Green, Speech Acts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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Similar books and articles
Krista Lawlor & John Perry (2008). Moore's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):421 – 427.
Mitchell S. Green (1999). Moore's Many Paradoxes. Philosophical Papers 28 (2):97-109.
John Williams (2007). Moore's Paradoxes and Iterated Belief. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:145-168.
Charles Sayward (1966). Assertion and Belief. Philosophical Studies 17 (5):74 - 78.
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