Perceiving Emotions

I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2010.00185.x
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
John McDowell (1982). Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge. Proceedings of the British Academy 68:455-79.

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Citations of this work BETA
Shannon Spaulding (2015). On Direct Social Perception. Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
Joel Smith (2013). The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):274-293.

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