David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61 (2010)
I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement of my own proposal that incorporates some of his insights
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Citations of this work BETA
James R. O'Shea (2012). The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
Mitchell S. Green (2010). Replies to Eriksson, Martin and Moore. Acta Analytica 25 (1):105-117.
James R. O'Shea (2012). 'The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
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