Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (2000)
This book is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception is defended.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$75.93 used (48% off) $105.88 new (27% off) $144.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B837.G74 2000|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Jeffrey Roland & Jon Cogburn (2011). Anti-Luck Epistemologies and Necessary Truths. Philosophia 39 (3):547-561.
Chris Tucker (2010). Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Justin P. McBrayer (2010). A Limited Defense of Moral Perception. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):305–320.
Chris Tucker (2014). On What Inferentially Justifies What: The Vices of Reliabilism and Proper Functionalism. Synthese 191:3311-3328.
Kelly Becker (2008). Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
Similar books and articles
Paul Kurtz (2010). Exuberant Skepticism. Prometheus Books 59 John Glenn Drive.
Joshua Seigal (2010). Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception. Forum Philosophicum: International Journal for Philosophy 15 (2):251-274.
Nick Trakakis & Yujin Nagasawa (2004). Skeptical Theism and Moral Skepticism : A Reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4 (4):1-1.
Mikael Janvid (2006). Contextualism and the Structure of Skeptical Arguments. Dialectica 60 (1):63–77.
Kevin McCain (2013). Two Skeptical Arguments or Only One? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.
John Greco (2003). Further Thoughts on Agent Reliabilism: Replies to Cohen, Geivett, Kvanvig, and Schmitt and Lahroodi. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):466–480.
T. A. Warfield (2001). Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Philosophical Review 110 (4):642-644.
Jonathan Vogel (2004). Review: Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (451):552-555.
John Greco (2003). Précis of Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):432–436.
John Greco (ed.) (2008). The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads23 ( #116,841 of 1,699,523 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #362,609 of 1,699,523 )
How can I increase my downloads?