David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Routledge, Chapman and Hall (1988)
Philosophers have traditionally tried to understand the emotions and their bearing on rationality and moral motivation by assimilating emotion to other categories such as sensation, judgment, and desire. In recent years, moving away from the Cartesian identification of emotions with particular sensations, many philosophers have embraced "judgmentalism," the view that emotions are essentially evaluative judgments or beliefs, with only an accidental connection to the feelings and impulses we intuitively take as "emotional." Anger, for instance, either is or entails the belief that one has been wronged and that the source of injury or offense deserves punishment.
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Citations of this work BETA
Rick Anthony Furtak (2010). Emotion, the Bodily, and the Cognitive. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):51 – 64.
Stuart Brock (2007). Fictions, Feelings, and Emotions. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):211 - 242.
Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen (2008). Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account. Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Christine Tappolet (2005). Ambivalent Emotions and the Perceptual Account of Emotions. Analysis 65 (287):229-233.
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