History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2):105-139 (2009)
|Abstract||On investigating a theorem that Russell used in discussing paradoxes of classes, Graham Priest distills a schema and then extends it to form an Inclosure Schema, which he argues is the common structure underlying both class-theoretical paradoxes (such as that of Russell, Cantor, Burali-Forti) and the paradoxes of ?definability? (offered by Richard, König-Dixon and Berry). This article shows that Russell's theorem is not Priest's schema and questions the application of Priest's Inclosure Schema to the paradoxes of ?definability?.1 1?Special thanks to Francesco Orilia for criticisms of an early draft of this article|
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