Split brains and singular personhood

Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306 (1993)
In this paper it is argued that the experimental data on commissurotomy patients provide no grounds for denying the singular personhood of commissurotomy patients. This is because, contrary to most philosophical accounts, there is no “unity of consciousness” discriminating condition for singular personhood that is violated in the case of commissurotomy patients, and because no contradictions arise when singular personhood is ascribed to commissurotomy patients
Keywords Brain  Existence  Metaphysics  Personality  Personhood
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1993.tb01722.x
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References found in this work BETA
Immanuel Kant (2007). Critique of Pure Reason. In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 449-451.

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