Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The employment of a particular class of computer programs known as "connectionist networks" to model mental processes is a widespread approach to research in cognitive science these days. Little has been written, however, on the precise connection that is thought to hold between such programs and actual in vivo cognitive processes such that the former can be said to "model" the latter in a scientific sense. What is more, this relation can be shown to be problematic. In this paper I give a brief overview of the use of connectionist models in cognitive science, and then explore some of the statements connectionists have made about the nature of the "modeling relation" thought to hold between them and cognitive processes. Finally I show that these accounts are inadequate and that more work is necessary if connectionist networks are to be seriously regarded as scientific models of cognitive processes.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
John Hawthorne (1989). On the Compatibility of Connectionist and Classical Models. Philosophical Psychology 2 (1):5-16.
Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (2006). How Do Connectionist Networks Compute? Cognitive Processing 7 (1):30-41.
Paul Skokowski (2007). Networks with Attitudes. Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.
Michael R. W. Dawson, D. A. Medler & Istvan S. N. Berkeley (1997). PDP Networks Can Provide Models That Are Not Mere Implementations of Classical Theories. Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):25-40.
Martin Roth (2005). Program Execution in Connectionist Networks. Mind and Language 20 (4):448-467.
Benny Shanon (1992). Are Connectionist Models Cognitive? Philosophical Psychology 5 (3):235-255.
S. Phillips (1998). Are Feedforward and Recurrent Networks Systematic? Analysis and Implications for a Connectionist Cognitive Architecture. .
Brian P. McLaughlin & F. Warfield (1994). The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined. Synthese 101 (3):365-400.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads14 ( #90,548 of 739,402 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,269 of 739,402 )
How can I increase my downloads?