Skepticism, Reliabilism, and Virtue Epistemology

Abstract
I review a familiar skeptical argument from Hume, and conclude that it requires us to accept that there is no necessary relation between beliefs about the world and their evidential grounds; that is, there is no logical or quasi-logical relation between empirical beliefs and their grounds, such that their grounds entail them, or even make them probable. I then argue that generic reliabilism can accommodate this fact about evidential grounds in a non-skeptical way. According to reliabilism, the grounds for our beliefs constitute good evidence so long as they are contingently reliable. Next I argue that agent reliabilism successfully addresses two related problems for other versions of reliabilism: the fact that beliefs can be reliably formed by accident, and the need for subjective justification. Finally, I explain why agent reliabilism is properly conceived as a version of virtue epistemology
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Linda Zagzebski (2000). From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:173-179.
    Frank Hofmann (2013). Three Kinds of Reliabilism. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.
    John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.
    Guy Axtell (1997). Recent Work on Virtue Epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1):1 - 26.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2012-03-18

    Total downloads

    5 ( #178,779 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,666 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.