Showing, Sensing, and Seeming: Distinctively Sensory Representations and Their Contents

New York: Oxford University Press UK (2013)
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Abstract

Certain representations are bound in special ways to our sensory capacities; consider, for instance, pictures, sound recordings, and the various forms of mental sensory imagery. What do these representations have in common, and what makes them different from representations of other kinds? Dominic Gregory employs novel ideas on perceptual states and sensory perspectives to explain the special nature of the contents of distinctively sensory representations. The book contains extensive discussions of e.g. perceptual imagination, pictorial representation, and memories.

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Dominic Gregory
University of Sheffield

Citations of this work

Remembering objects.James Openshaw - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22:1–20.
Imagery and Possibility.Dominic Gregory - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):755-773.
Against the Additive View of Imagination.Nick Wiltsher - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):266-282.
Mental imagery.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 2001 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Counterfactual reasoning and knowledge of possibilities.Dominic Gregory - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):821-835.

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