|Abstract||Frege’s celebrated distinction between judgments and their contents invites the Tractarian denigration of his assertion sign as merely indicating the holding or putting forth as true of a thought, for whatever its other merits the marking of such an event seems of little relevance to a thought’s inferential significance. However, in light of (a) Frege’s conception of a logically correct language serving inter alia as an organon for the acquisition or reconstruction of knowledge, and (b) his epistemic conception of inference, it is argued that the sign of assertion is a device for distinguishing from all others those thoughts lying on the path of discovery. The drawing of such a distinction is then shown to be of inferential significance by elucidating Frege’s conception of inference as involving the acquisition or reconstruction of knowledge. Frege’s view of inference rules as codifying justificatory relations among judgments is then given an interpretation as making no undue use of psychological notions, and his denial that the assertion sign can have semantic content is shown to be mistaken but not in such a way as to frustrate the aim with which it is introduced.|
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