The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledge

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69 (2007)
Abstract
The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practical reasoning.
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    Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.

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