David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (2):195-207 (1990)
It is argued in this article that human actions may be said to be socially constituted : as being behavior that is constituted as human action by social relations and by participant agent and collective representations of behavior. In contrast to recent social constructionist accounts, it is argued that the social constitution of action does not pose any threat to the objectivity of classification or explanation in social psychological science. It does mark some significant ontological differences between natural and social psychological phenomena that have implications for the university and generality, but not the adequacy, of explanations of socially constituted human actions.
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Nicholas Bardsley (2005). Experimental Economics and the Artificiality of Alteration. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):239-251.
John D. Greenwood (1992). Against Eliminative Materialism: From Folk Psychology to Volkerpsychologie. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):349-68.
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