Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 35 (3):423-456 (2004)
|Abstract||Difficulties over probability have often been considered fatal to the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. Here I argue that the Everettian can have everything she needs from `probability' without recourse to indeterminism, ignorance, primitive identity over time or subjective uncertainty: all she needs is a particular *rationality principle*. The decision-theoretic approach recently developed by Deutsch and Wallace claims to provide just such a principle. But, according to Wallace, decision theory is itself applicable only if the correct attitude to a future Everettian measurement outcome is subjective uncertainty. I argue that subjective uncertainty is not to be had, but I offer an alternative interpretation that enables the Everettian to live without uncertainty: we can justify Everettian decision theory on the basis that an Everettian should *care about* all her future branches. The probabilities appearing in the decision-theoretic representation theorem can then be interpreted as the degrees to which the rational agent cares about each future branch. This reinterpretation, however, reduces the intuitive plausibility of one of the Deutsch-Wallace axioms (Measurement Neutrality).|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter J. Lewis (2007). Uncertainty and Probability for Branching Selves. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):1-14.
Alastair Wilson (forthcoming). Objective Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. British Journal for Philosophy of Science.
David Wallace (2003). Everettian Rationality: Defending Deutsch's Approach to Probability in the Everett Interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 34 (3):415-439.
David Baker (2007). Measurement Outcomes and Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (1):153-169.
David Wallace (2006). Epistemology Quantized: Circumstances in Which We Should Come to Believe in the Everett Interpretation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):655-689.
Peter J. Lewis (2010). Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. Manuscrito 33:285--306.
Huw Price, Decision-Based Probabilities in the Everett Interpretation: Comments on Wallace and Greaves.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #18,247 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #13,107 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?