Virtue Epistemology and the Relevant Sense of “Relevant Possibility”

Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):61-77 (1994)
Abstract
In this paper I defend a relevant possibilities approach against a familiar kind of skepticism, and I argue that virtue epistemology can provide a theoretical grounding for the kind of solutions that is offered. In the section that follows I outline both the skeptical problems and the solution. In the remaining sections I develop the proposal in more detail. If my argument is sound then the paper also constitutes an argument in favor of virtue epistemology.
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