David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26 (2012)
Section 1 articulates a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability. Equivalently: In cases of knowledge, S’s success in believing the truth is attributable to S’s ability. That idea is then applied to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. Section 2 asks what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. Section 3 reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. Section 4 proposes a different way of understanding the relation, and shows how the resulting view does resolve the objection. Section 5 completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities. Section 6 briefly addresses Barn Façade cases and lottery propositions. Section 7 briefly addresses a question about the scope of knowledge; in particular, it shows how the new view allows a neo-Moorean response to skepticism
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Clayton Littlejohn (2014). Fake Barns and False Dilemmas. Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
J. Adam Carter (2014). Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2).
Benjamin Jarvis (2013). Knowledge, Cognitive Achievement, and Environmental Luck. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (4):529-551.
J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard (forthcoming). Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
Peter L. Samuelson & Ian M. Church (2014). When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and Biases in Light of Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Psychology 28 (8):1095-1113.
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