David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 25 (4):394-417 (2010)
It is clear that visual imagery is somehow significantly visual. Some theorists, like Kosslyn, claim that the visual nature of visualisations derives from features of the neural processes which underlie those episodes. Pylyshyn claims, however, that it may merely reflect special features of the contents which we grasp when we visualise things. This paper discusses and rejects Pylyshyn's own attempts to identify the respects in which the contents of visualisations are notably visual. It then offers a novel and very different account of what is distinctively sensory about the contents of sensory images. The paper's alternative account is used in explaining various pieces of phenomenological and behavioural data concerning visualisation. Finally, it is tentatively suggested that the proposed account of the contents of sensory images may also shed light upon some of the neurological data involving visualisation and sensory imagery more generally
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen M. Kosslyn (1980). Image and Mind. Harvard University Press.
Zenon Pylyshyn (2004). Imagery. In R. L. Gregory (ed.), Oxford Companion to the Mind. Oxford University Press
Robert Hopkins (1998). Picture, Image and Experience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Cambridge University Press.
Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2002). Mental Imagery: In Search of a Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):157-182.
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