Virtue, luck and the pyrrhonian problematic

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):9--34 (2006)
A number of contemporary philosophers endorse a Pyrrhonian theme: that one has knowledge only if one knows or understands that one’s beliefs are reliably formed. Otherwise, one is like a man who grasps gold in the dark: such a man is successful, but his success is a matter of luck, and so not creditable to him. It is argued that the skeptical problem and the problem of moral luck share a common structure and a common solution. Specifically, a virtue-theoretic approach helps us to understand important relations among luck, success and credit for success. It is argued that knowledge is an instance of success through virtue, and that, in general, success through virtue is creditable to the virtuous agent.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Baumann (2014). No Luck With Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):523-551.
John Turri (2011). Contingent A Priori Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.
John Greco (2007). External World Skepticism. Philosophy Compass 2 (4):625–649.

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