Was Searle's Descriptivism Refuted?

Teorema 17 (1):109-13 (1998)
Abstract
It is generally thought that <span class='Hi'>Searle</span>'s cluster theory of the sense of a proper name was soundly refuted by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. This paper challenges this widespread belief and argues that the observations made by Kripke do not show that <span class='Hi'>Searle</span>'s version of descriptivism is false. Indeed, charitably interpreted, <span class='Hi'>Searle</span>'s theory retains considerable plausibility.
Keywords Proper names  Kripke  Cluster theory of naming
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,360
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    H. E. Baber (1987). How Bad Is Rape? Hypatia 2 (2):125 - 138.
    Robert Batterman (1992). Quantum Chaos and Semiclassical Mechanics. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:50 - 65.
    Peter J. Taylor (1994). Shifting Frames: From Divided to Distributed Psychologies of Scientific Agents. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:304 - 310.
    Tang Yijie & Yan Xin (2008). The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (4):477 - 501.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-11-17

    Total downloads

    15 ( #90,364 of 1,088,810 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,735 of 1,088,810 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.