Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 88 (1):1-30 (2006)
|Abstract||Aristotle's notion of experience plays an important role in his epistemology as the link between perception and memory on the one side, and higher cognitive capacities on the other side. However, Aristotle does not say much about it, and what he does say seems inconsistent. Notably, some passages suggest that it is a non-rational capacity, others that it is a rational capacity and that it provides the principles of science. This paper presents a unitary account of experience. It explains how experience grows from perception and memory into a rational capacity, and in what way it provides the principles.|
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