Sextus empiricus on the possibility of inquiry

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):436-459 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract: In this paper I discuss Sextus Empiricus' response to the dogmatists' objection that the skeptics cannot inquire into philosophical theories and at the same time suspend judgment about everything. I argue that his strategy consists in putting the burden of proof on the dogmatists: it is they, and not the skeptics, who must justify the claim to be able to inquire into the nature of things. Sextus' arguments purport to show that if we consider the dogmatists' inquiry, we should conclude either that it is impossible or that it does not supply the skeptics with satisfactory starting-points for further inquiry.
Keywords agnosticism
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Citations of this work BETA
Filip Grgić (2012). Investigative and Suspensive Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):n/a-n/a.
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Diego E. Machuca (2008). Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy. Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Theologie 55 (1/2):28-63.
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