A note on empiricism and the philosophy of mind
Philosophical Studies 10 (3):45-48 (1959)
| Abstract | This article has no associated abstract. (fix it) | |||||||||
| Keywords | Circularity Epistemology Given Knowledge Observation Regress Sellars, W | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesWillem deVries & Timm Triplett (2006). Is Sellars'a Rylean Hypothesis Plausible? A Dialogue. In The Self-Correcting Enterprise: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars.
Robert B. Brandom (2009). Pragmatism, Inferentialism, and Modality in Sellars's Arguments Against Empiricism. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
James R. O.’Shea (2012). The 'Theory Theory' of Mind and the Aims of Sellars' Original Myth of Jones. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.
Willem A. deVries & Paul Coates (2009). Brandom's Two-Ply Error. In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
Wilfrid S. Sellars (1956). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Ernest Sosa (2003). Are There Two Grades of Knowledge? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):113–130.
Michael Williams (2003). Are There Two Grades of Knowledge? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):91–112.
Robert M. Gordon (2000). Sellars's Ryleans Revisited. Protosociology 14:102-114.
John McDowell (2009). Why is Sellars's Essay Called "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind"? In Willem A. DeVries (ed.), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: Essays on Wilfrid Sellars. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads22 ( #56,103 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
